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LAWRENCE CHURCH ON THE SCOPE OF
tJDICIAL REVIEW AND ORIGINAL
INTENTION
RAOUL BERGER*
The scope of judicial review and the influence of the original inten-
tion doctrine continue to excite debate. The controversy exploded in the
hearings on the confirmation of Judge Robert Bork to a seat on the
Supreme Court, and it has had repercussions on the subsequent hearings
of Justice David Souter. For the Court has assumed an ever-expanding
role in making the major policy decisions that the Constitution reserves
to the people and their elected representatives. The continuing debate is
therefore of great moment; ultimately the truth will emerge from these
exchanges in the marketplace of ideas.
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Prompted by my critique of William Nelson's The Fourteenth
Amendment,' Professor Lawrence Church launched upon a survey of the
role of the courts and the impact of original intention, matters I did not
discuss.2 In passing he indulged in a few remarks about my views of the
Amendment. Since those remarks illustrate afresh the need to weigh evi-
dence-a need that will color much of the subsequent discussion-they
merit immediate consideration. Berger's "portrayal of history," Church
asserts, "is not the only possible reading of history," instancing Nelson's
"very different description of the past."3 There cannot be a "very differ-
ent" reading, for example, of the exclusion of suffrage from the Four-
teenth Amendment, the evidence for which, Justice Harlan truly
declared, is "irrefutable and still unanswered."4 Nelson himself noted
that Jacob Howard "declared unequivocally that section one did 'not
* B.A. 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M.
1938, Harvard University; LL.D. 1975, University of.Cincinnati; LL.D. 1978, University of
Michigan; LL.D. 1988, Northwestern University.
1. Raoul Berger, Fantasizing About the Fourteenth Amendment, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1043
(reviewing WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCI-
PLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988)).
2. Lawrence Church, History and the Constitutional Role of the Courts, 1990 Wis. L.
REV. 1071.
3. Id. at 1073, 1079.
4. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgment).
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give [blacks] the right of voting.' "I Where is the very different reading
on what was the centerpiece of my study? No activist, to my knowledge,
has ventured to dispute the evidence that suffrage was excluded. So too,
eminent scholars have accepted my demonstration that segregation was
excluded from the Amendment;6 Michael Perry listed examples of "com-
mentary generally accepting Berger's history" and some "generally effec-
tive rebuttals by Berger to criticism of his history."' 7 Moreover, merely
to point to differences of opinion is to leave the reader adrift. Lawyers
are accustomed to adjudication of conflicting views. When a critic ad-
verts to an opposing view, he should undertake to evaluate the difference.
5. WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 129 (1988).
6. The evidence that segregation also was excluded from the Fourteenth Amendment is
quite convincing. See, eg., James Wilson's statement, infra text accompanying note 9.
Although he addressed the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, the Bill and Amendment were deemed to
be "identical"; the Bill was incorporated in the Amendment to prevent repeal by a subsequent
Congress. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 22-23 (1977).
Judge Robert Bork noted that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), "was
accepted by law professors as inconsistent with the original understanding." ROBERT BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 77 (1990). Nathan-
iel Nathanson observed that Alexander Bickel "conclusively" demonstrated that segregation
was excluded from the Fourteenth Amendment, and that "Berger's independent research and
analysis confirms and adds weight to these conclusions." Nathaniel Nathanson, Book Review,
56 TEX. L. REV. 579, 580-81 (1978); see also Dean Alfange, Jr., On Judicial Policymaking and
Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 606-07 (1978) (book review) (recognizing Berger's
careful review of history); Randall Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 907, 909-10, 912-
13 (same); Donald Kommers, Role of the Supreme Court, 40 REv. POL. 409, 413 (1978) (book
review) (same).
Judge Learned Hand wrote of Brown: "I have never been able to understand on what
basis it does or can rest except as a coup de main." LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 55
(1962).
7. Michael J. Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 285 n.100 (1981). Another candid activist, Larry Alexander, wrote: "Ber-
ger has quite convincingly demonstrated that the bulk of modem judicial decisions under the
fourteenth amendment cannot be justified by reference to what the drafters of that amendment
believed the amendment would accomplish." Larry Alexander, Modern Equal Protection The-
ories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 4 (1981).
Henry Abraham wrote that "[A]ny genuinely objective, factual and rigorous examination
of the debates and history of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that the
authors and supporters of that provision specifically rejected its application to segregated
schools and the franchise." Henry Abraham, "Equal Justice Under Law" or "Justice At Any
Cost"? The Judicial Role Revisited: Reflections on GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 6 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 467, 467
(1979) (book review). In a similar context Lord Beloff, an eminent Oxford emeritus, stated,
"The quite extraordinary contorsions that have gone into proving the contrary make sad read-
ing for those impressed by the high quality of American legal historical scholarship." Max
Beloff, Arbiters of America's Destiny, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 7, 1978 (Higher Educ. Supp.
II), at II (book review).
ORIGINAL INTENTION
Instead, Church seizes on a couple of minor factual details to show that
the conflict is insoluble:
To some extent, the disagreement between Berger and Nelson is
over the relative political stature of such men as Senators Sum-
ner and Trumbull and the relative importance of newspapers as
opposed to the correspondence and speeches of individual lead-
ers. This is an argument that may never end.
Not so.
To begin with, Church's "newspapers as opposed to the correspon-
dence.., of individual leaders," does not accurately reflect my views. I
did not refer to correspondence of leaders but to letters from citizens to
leaders. Such letters cannot overcome explanations in Congress by lead-
ers to their fellow draftsmen. And I emphasized that a newspaper article
could not balance an explanation in the halls of Congress by the chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee, James Wilson, that the Civil
Rights Bill of 1866 did not provide for unsegregated schools.9 Although
Church modestly states that he is "not qualified to review" Berger's
"portrayal of history,"1 so practiced and accomplished a lawyer would
hardly maintain that a newspaper article would outweigh a statement to
the contrary in Congress by a leader.
Similarly, the facts concerning Trumbull and Sumner are indisputa-
ble, are not a mere matter of their "stature" but go to the weight of their
testimony, which can readily be evaluated. Sumner was a far-out Radi-
cal; his biographer, David Donald, recounts that "[m]ore and more Sena-
tors came to distrust, when they did not detest, him."' 1 Senator Lyman
Trumbull, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and sponsor of
the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, scathingly commented, "it has been over
the idiosyncracies, over the unreasonable propositions, over the impracti-
cal measures of [Sumner] that freedom has been proclaimed and estab-
lished."12 Patently Sumner did not reflect Senate sentiment, and he
carries no weight as a witness to the Drafters' intention. Trumbull, on
8. Church, supra note 2, at 1079.
9. Berger, supra note 1, at 1045.
10. Church, supra note 2, at 1073.
11. DAVID DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 248 (1970).
12. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess 422 (1870) (statement of Sen. Trumbull), quoted in
MICHAEL L. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS
AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, at 39 (1974). Senator William Fessenden, chairman of the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, gleefully repeated a tongue-lashing he gave Sumner on
the Senate floor, whom he considered "by far the greatest fool of the lot." JOSEPH JAMES, THE
FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 74 (1956). Thaddeus Stevens, Radical leader
in the House, excoriated Sumner for obstructing passage of the Amendment because it did not
give Negroes the vote. FAWN BRODIE, THADDEUS STEVENS: SCOURGE OF THE SOUTH 269
(1966).
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the other hand, played a leading role. The "specifics of Reconstruction
policy were determined primarily by moderate Republican leaders such
as Senators Lyman Trumbull and William P. Fessenden," who sought
"to limit the degree to which the federal government interceded to pro-
tect the civil rights of the freedmen." 3 Sumner and Trumbull simply are
not to be weighed on the same scales as witnesses to the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 14 Such matters are not settled by reference to
"a more favorable review" by another,15 which presumably did not
weigh these particular facts; they call for an assessment of incontrovert-
ible facts. If my inferences from those facts were wrong, it was incum-
bent on Church to point out why. He did not hesitate to draw larger
inferences from a mass of political-science facts.
ORIGINAL INTENTION
Church observes that proponents of original intention may be result-
oriented, invoking original intention because it coincides with their views
on substantive issues.16 In fact, result-oriented argumentation is an ac-
tivist characteristic. Paul Brest pleaded with his brethren "simply to ac-
knowledge that most of our writings [about judicial review] are not
political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately
designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public
good."1" Speaking for myself, I bring no social agenda to my studies. As
long ago as 1942, I announced against the background of Bridges v. Cali-
fornia, Is the result of which was in accord with my desires, that I liked it
no more when the Court read my predilections into the Constitution
than when the Four Horsemen read in theirs.19 From that credo I have
never wavered. Although I am pro-choice on the abortion issue, and
against prayer in the schools, I consider that the abortion and school
prayers decisions are without constitutional warrant. Further, I have
been labelled a "Neo-conservative," 2 ° when in truth I am a life-long lib-
13. MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 61-62 (1977). In truth, Benedict has shown,
"the nonradicals had enacted their program over the sullen acquiescence of some radicals and
over the open opposition of many." BENEDICT, supra note 12, at 210.
14. Harold Laski considered it just criticism that a writer "has no sense of the propor-
tional value of his authorities." 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETrRS 1463 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953).
15. Church, supra note 2, at 1080 n.24.
16. Id. at 1073.
17. Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981).
18. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
19. Raoul Berger, Constructive Contempt: A PostMortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 605
(1942).
20. Kermit Hall, American Legal History as Science and Applied Politics, 4 BENCHMARK
[Vol. 70
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eral. It is the liberals, advocates of change and reform, who stand most
in need of protection by a fixed constitution. For me the paramount con-
sideration is the integrity of the Constitution, untainted by political or
personal preferences.
Church's attempt to set forth the originalist position falls short. He
views it as a sort of ancestor worship, "deference," "respect" for, "hom-
age to the wisdom of the founders," "reverence for our past leaders."'"
He reduces it to "scholastic arguments over the niceties of history."22
Very different is the case for originalism. First, as a matter of common
sense, who but the writer can best explain what he means by his own
words? Activists exalt the reader over the writer. Well aware of such
considerations, John Selden, the preeminent seventeenth-century scholar,
stated, "a mans wryting has but one true sense; which is that which the
Author meant when he writ it."23 John Locke was even more em-
phatic.24 Nor do originalists try "to divine... what our forebears actu-
ally thought"; we are not psychoanalysts.25 Instead we look to the
Framers' recorded explanations of what they meant to accomplish.
Second, originalism has its roots in 600 years of Anglo-American
practice, and as Justice Holmes remarked, "[i]f a thing has been practised
for two hundred years... it will need a strong case" for a departure from
the practice.26 Here I can select only a few highlights across the
229, 235 (1990). J.M. Balkin noted that my earlier works, "which served to rebut the Nixon
administration's views about executive privilege and impeachment" made "Berger the darling
of liberal scholars." J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 913 (1988) (book review). He remarked that "All of this [was] changed"
by my 1977 GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 6, which met with "a host of attacks"
from my liberal confreres, Balkin, supra, at 913, notwithstanding that I used precisely the same
resort to original intention.
21. Church, supra note 2, at 1074-76.
22. Id. at 1086.
23. TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 12-13 (Sir Frederick Pollock ed., 1927).
24. When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood... [to] make
known his ideas to the hearer. That, then which words are the marks of are the ideas
of the speaker: nor can any one apply them as marks.... to anything else but the
ideas that he himself hath: for this would be to make them signs of his own concep-
tions ... and so in effect to have no signification at all ....
ET]his is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, and they
can be signs of nothing else.
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING Bk. III, ch. II, §§ 2,
8, at 204, 206 (Raymond Wilburn ed., 1947).
25. Church, supra note 2, at 1079 (emphasis added).
26. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922). In the legislative chaplain case,
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), the Court stated, a "practice [that] has continued
without interruption ever since [the earliest] session of Congress" does not violate the First
Amendment. Id. at 788.
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centuries.
1. The fifteenth-century sage, Chief Justice Frowyck, recounted
that the judges demanded of the "makers" of the Statute of Westminster
(1285) what certain words meant and they "answered." "And so," he
added, "in our dayes, have those that were the penners & devisors of
statutes bene the grettest lighte for exposicion of statutes."1
2 7
2. The English historian S.B. Chrimes wrote that the "rule of ref-
erence to the intention of the legislators... was certainly established by
the second half of the fifteenth century.
'2 8
3. Lord Chancellor Hatton wrote circa 1587, "when the intent is
proved, that must be followed.., but whensoever there is a departure
from words to the intent, that must be well proved that there was such a
meaning. 929
4. In the Magdalen College Case (1615) Coke stated that "in Acts
of Parliament which are to be construed according to the intent and
meaning of the makers of them, the original intent and meaning is to be
observed."
31
5. Such precedents were epitomized in Matthew Bacon's Abridg-
ment (1736): "Everything which is within the Intention of the Makers of
a statute is, although it is not written in the Letter thereof, as much
within the Statute as that which is within the Letter.1
3 1
"It is the tradition of Coke's time," Julius Goebel observed, "that
passes over to the American colonies, for it is upon the methods and
constitutional views of Coke that the colonial lawyers were nurtured."3 2
Then too, the English Puritan's fear of the "judges' imposition of their
personal views," of "twisted ... judicial construction," according to a
critic of original intention, travelled to America and influenced "the
27. A DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES 151-52
(Samuel Thorne ed., 1942) [hereinafter DISCOURSE].
28. STANLEY B. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CEN-
TURY 293 (1936).
29. CHRISTOPHER HATTON, A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES & ACTS OF PARLIA-
MENT: AND THE EXPOSITION THEREOF 14-15 (1677).
30. 11 Co. Rep. 66b, 73b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1235, 1245 (K.B. 1615).
31. 4 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 647-48 (3d ed. 1768).
32. Julius Goebel, Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. REV.
555, 563 (1938). "The 'founding fathers' owed their mental sustenance much more largely to
seventeenth-century England than to the England with which they were themselves contempo-
rary." EDWARD CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 102 (1934). The Ameri-
can Constitution, J.H. Plumb wrote, "was designed to avoid the seeming corruption of the
British Constitution in the 18th century." J.H. Plumb, Notes From London: Inflation, frustra-
tion and tea, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1973, § 6, at 20, 24; see JOHN CLIVE, MACAULAY: THE
SHAPING OF THE HISTORIAN 124, 125 (1974).
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American revolutionaries."" And he recounts that the Jeffersonian
revolution of 1800 was regarded as the people's endorsement of their
"search for the Constitution's underlying and original 'intent.' "3' Not
surprisingly, Chief Justice Marshall stated that he could "cite from [the
common law] the most complete evidence that the intention is the most
sacred rule of interpretation."35 In 1838 the Supreme Court declared
'that construction
must necessarily depend on the words of the constitution; the
meaning and intention of the convention which framed and
proposed it for adoption and ratification to the conventions...
in the several states.., to which the Court has always resorted
in construing the constitution.36
An early activist, Jacobus tenBroek, acknowledged that the Court "has
insisted, with almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end and object of
constitutional construction is the discovery of the intention of those per-
sons who formulated the instrument or of the people who adopted it."37
In short, originalism, wrote Thomas Grey, an activist, "is deeply rooted
in our history [and] in our formal constitutional law."
38
The deep-rooted doctrine of contemporaneous construction rein-
forces reference to the original intention. As long ago as the fifteenth
century, Chief Justice Frowyck stated that if the legislators "have not
gyven anie declaracion of theire myndes, then . . . theire authoritye
muste persuade us that were mooste neerest the statute."39 The reason,
our Justice William Johnson explained, is that contemporaries of the
Constitution "had the best opportunities of informing themselves of the
understanding of the framers... and of the sense put upon it by the
people when it was adopted by them."'' It is unreasonable to defer to
33. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 885, 891-92 (1985). The Puritans feared that the "advantages of a known and written
law would be lost if the law's meaning could be twisted by means of judicial construction." Id.
at 892.
34. Id. at 927.
35. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland 167 (Gerald Gunther ed.,
1969).
36. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838).
37. Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Consti-
tutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 399, 399 (1939).
38. Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705
(1975).
39. DISCOURSE, supra note 27, at 152.
40. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827) (Johnson, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Marshall stated, "Great weight has always been attached, and very rightly at-
tached, to contemporaneous exposition." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 417
(1821).
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the "understanding of the framers" received at second hand, while re-
jecting their own explanations of their intention. The same result is dic-
tated by a related rule going back to Heydon's Case (1586): the judge
must seek "the mischief the framers were seeking to alleviate."'" That
mischief was collected from extrinsic circumstances. Why are such data
entitled to more respect than the Framers own explanation of what they
sought to accomplish?
Finally, original intention serves as a constraint, a brake upon illim-
itable discretion, of which the Founders had "profound fear."4 2 Church
notes that original intention would force judges "to adhere to standards
beyond their definitional control."43 He recognizes that if judges "are
not bound by the intent of the founders.., then there may be no limits at
all to their power,"' that if they "are not limited by relatively fixed and
precise standards, there is an obvious potential for arbitrary ... exercise
of power."45 Then too, "our government," the Declaration of Indepen-
dence declares, "is founded on the consent of the governed." The terms
of that consent are spelled out in the Constitution. "The people,"
averred Justice James Iredell, one of the ablest Founders, "have chosen
to be governed under such and such principles. They have not chosen to
be governed, or promised to submit upon any other .... 46 When they
adopted the Constitution and then the Fourteenth Amendment it was
upon the basis of explanations made to them. To repudiate such repre-
sentations would be a fraud upon the people.47
41. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REv. 929, 943 (1965); see Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584).
42. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 298
(1969). In the early days of the Republic, Chancellor James Kent referred to a "dangerous
discretion [of judges] to roam at large in the trackless fields of their own imaginations." I
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 341 (Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 1873).
Justice Story praised the many "rules ... for the construction of statutes... to limit the
discretion ofjudges." Joseph Story, Law, Legislation and the Codes (1831), reprinted in JAMES
MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 362-63 (1971).
The discretion of judges, said Lord Camden, is "'the law of tyrants .... In the best it is
oftentimes caprice: In the worst it is every vice, folly, and passion, to which human nature is
liable,'" quoted, of all things, by that archpriest of discretion, Justice Brennan, dissenting in
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 285 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Car-
dozo wrote, a judge "is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
141 (1921).
43. Church, supra note 2, at 1088.
44. Id. at 1087-88.
45. Id. at 1076.
46. 2 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (New
York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857-1858).
47. Justice Story wrote, "If the constitution was ratified under the belief, sedulously prop-
agated on all sides, that such protection was afforded, would it not now be a fraud upon the
[Vol. 70
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What arguments does Church muster against these historical facts?
He dwells on the difficulty of ascertaining the original intention, alluding
to "differing interpretations of history,"4 and stressing that "historical
studies do not yield clear enough evidence of original intent to operate as
a reliable restraint." 9 If the evidence is at times unclear or inconclusive
it cannot serve, but that does not warrant discarding evidence that is
clear. Let me recur to a crystal-clear instance of original intent-the
indisputable exclusion of suffrage from the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 2 provides that if suffrage is denied on account of race, the state's
representation in the House of Representatives shall be proportionally
reduced. Senator Fessenden, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Re-
construction, explained that the Amendment "leaves the power where it
is; but it tells them [the States] most distinctly, if you exercise that power
wrongfully, such and such consequences will follow. '5° Senator How-
ard, to whom it fell to explain the Amendment because of Fessenden's
illness, said:
We know very well that the States retain the power.., of regu-
lating the right of suffrage in the States .... That right has
never been taken from them;.., and the theory of this whole
amendment is, to leave the power of regulating the suffrage
with the people or Legislatures of the States, and not assume to
regulate it by any clause of the Constitution of the United
States. 51
Howard is confirmed by the Report of the Joint Committee on Recon-
struction, which drafted the Amendment: "It was doubtful... whether
the States would consent to surrender a power they had always exercised,
and to which they were attached." Consequently the Committee com-
mended Section 2 because it "would leave the whole question with the
people of each State."5" Such history may not be dismissed as "pedantic
whole people to give a different construction to its powers?" 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1084, at 33 (5th ed. 1905).
48. Church, supra note 2, at 1079. Activist Michael Moore considers that the difficulties
of ascertainment of intention are only "problems of evidence, of verifying just what intentions
a person has on a given occasion. The surmountability of these problems is shown by the law
of crimes, torts, and contracts, where we presuppose the existence and discoverability of the
real intentions of individuals all of the time." Michael Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Inter-
pretation, 58 S. CAL. L. RV. 277, 350 (1985).
The problem posed by "legislative" intent as distinguished from that of a single person is
discussed in Raoul Berger, Original Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 IND. L.J. 723, 730-32, 736-37,
739 (1991).
49. Church, supra note 2, at 1088.
50. ALFRED AvINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 143 (1967).
51. Id. at 237.
52. Id. at 94. Notwithstanding, Church serenely contemplates "judicial support ... in
cases dealing with the 'quagmire' of political gerrymandering." Church, supra note 2, at 1103.
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arguments over historical nuances," as "scholastic arguments over the
niceties of history. '5 3 There are other examples of clear historical in-
tent.54 The possibility that it may at times be difficult to ascertain the
original intention does not justify overruling it when it is clear beyond
peradventure, as the Court did with its "one-man--one vote" decisions.
Church also refers to "[t]he possibility that history is being cynically
manipulated." 55 Texts too may be manipulated, witness the attempt to
read a prohibition of death penalties into the "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" clause of the Eighth Amendment."5 6 Possible abuse of a doctrine
does not impeach its value.57
THE JUDICIAL ROLE
The world of today, Church accentuates, is vastly different from
that of the Founders; he musters an array of facts to demonstrate that
government itself has changed over the years and concludes that the
courts should study "how to structure a democracy to best suit today's
economic, social, demographic and political realities.""8 To be sure, the
"capacity to adapt to changing substantive policy needs is ... a basic
goal"; 9 but where does the Constitution make the courts the instrument
of change? Judicial review is not even mentioned in the Constitution. Be
it assumed that "the traditional role of the courts should now be reexam-
ined in the light of changes," 6° is it left to the courts to adjust their own
powers?61 This, Church considers, "is too important a matter to leave to
nostalgia or static historical interpretation."62 To remove the matter
from nostalgia and statical considerations let us begin with some basics,
cogently summarized by Philip Kurland:
The concept of the written constitution is that it defines the
authority of government and its limits, that government is the
creature of the constitution and cannot do what it does not au-
53. Church, supra note 2, at 1086, 1105.
54. Raoul Berger, TheActivist Legacy of the New Deal Court, 59 WASH. L. REv. 751, 755-
66 (1984).
55. Church, supra note 2, at 1080.
56. The Eighth Amendment cannot be read to nullify the Fifth's permission to deprive a
person of life after a due process trial.
57. "It is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use of existence of a power, from
the possibility of its abuse." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344 (1816).
58. Church, supra note 2, at 1103.
59. Id. at 1076.
60. Id. at 1098.
61. Hamilton stated that "an agent cannot new-model his own commission." 6 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 166 (Henry C. Lodge ed., 1904).
62. Church, supra note 2, at 1098.
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thorize .... A priori, such a constitution could only have a
fixed and unchanging meaning, if it were to fulfill its function.63
For changed conditions, the instrument itself made provision
for amendment which, in accordance with the concept of a
written constitution, was expected to be the only form of
change. 4
Consider the established tradition as to the judicial function at the
adoption of the Constitution. Francis Bacon had counselled judges "to
remember that their office is to interpret the law, and not to make it."
'65
In his 1791 Lectures, Justice James Wilson, a leading architect of the
Constitution, stated that the judge "will remember that his duty and his
business is, not to make the law, but to interpret and apply it."'66 That
became the settled creed of the Supreme Court.67 To step beyond this
was to violate the separation of powers, for, as said by Chief Justice Mar-
shall, "The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the
law."
68
Let us more closely inquire into the Founders' design. With respect
to "the basic constitutional doctrines of federalism and the separation of
powers," Church observes, "the founders envisaged a more modest judi-
cial role.., than the position the federal courts have come to assume.",
69
He recognizes that "the present position of the courts is not what the
founders anticipated."70 These "generally restrictive views of the foun-
ders" are not an "artificial limitation";71 they resulted from the Foun-
63. Justice Story wrote, the Constitution "is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent con-
struction. It should be... not dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but
the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." 1 STORY, supra note 47, § 426, at 326. In
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (C.C. Pa. 1795), Justice William Paterson,
who had been a leading Framer, stated, "[tlhe Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the
permanent will of the people." Id. at 308; see Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920);
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1905), overruled on other grounds by
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
64. PHILIP KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978) (footnote added).
In McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), the Court rejected the notion that the Constitu-
tion may be "amended by judicial decision without action by the designated organs in the
mode by which alone amendments can be made." Id. at 36.
65. 1 SELECTED WRITINGS OF FRANCIS BACON 138 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
66. 2 JAMES WILSON, WORKS 502 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).
67. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874); Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 1, 41 (1849).
68. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825). Church considers it "unfor-
tunate that constitutional law casebooks tend to pay little attention to the topic of separation of
powers." Church, supra note 2, at 1105 n.113.
69. Church, supra note 2, at 1081.
70. Id. at 1073.
71. Id. at 1105.
19911
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ders' jealous dread of the greedy expansiveness of power,72 hence their
limited delegations. Church notes that "Democratic theory generally
relegates courts to a lesser position than that enjoyed by the political
branches," that courts "are less accountable than any other policymakers
in government," so that in light of their life tenure the "judiciary is
counter-majoritarian." ' How did they get that way?
Church would answer that "[a] gradual process of constitutional
change has, after all, been continuing for two hundred years."'74 More
baldly, the Court has steadily been arrogating undelegated power. Be-
cause "evolutionary change has always been a feature of the common law
system that predated the Constitution,"75 it does not follow that judges
are likewise free to remodel the Constitution. The premises are totally
different. Parliament delegated to the courts the task of fashioning the
law of torts, contracts, and the like; as Cardozo observed, the rules were
"the creation of the courts, themselves, and [could] be abrogated by
courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation of the rule
would do violence to the social conscience."76 Statutes, however, could
not be set aside or revised by courts.7 7 No delegation was made to our
courts to revise the Constitution. Marshall stated that the judicial power
"cannot be the assertion of a right to change that instrument."78 And in
72. The Founders were unceasingly concerned with power's "endlessly propulsive ten-
dency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries." BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUrION 56 (1967).
73. Church, supra note 2, at 1087. In THE FEDERALIST No. 51 Hamilton (or Madison)
observed that "In a republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predomi-
nates." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 338 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Mod. Lib.
ed. 1937). And Hamilton assured the Ratifiers that of the three branches, the judiciary was
"'next to nothing."' Id., No. 78, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (quoting 1 CHARLES MONTES-
QUIEU, SPIrr OF LAWS 186 (n.d.)).
74. Church, supra note 2, at 1103. Thomas Rutherforth's explanation of why the legisla-
tive is superior to the executive is equally applicable to the judicial:
The legislative is the joynt understanding of the society directing what is proper to be
done, and is therefore naturally superior to the executive, which is the joynt strength
of the society exerting itself in taking care, that what is so directed shall be done.
2 THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 71 (Cambridge, J. Bentham
1756).
75. Church, supra note 2, at 1103 n.108.
76. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 136-37 (1924). But Cardozo
regarded a statute as binding: .A judge "may not substitute his own reading for one established
by the legislature." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 55 (1928).
77. Lord Ellesmere declared in The Earl of Oxford's Case that "our Books are, That the
Acts and Statutes of Parliament ought to be revers'd by Parliament (only), and not otherwise."
1 Chan. Rep. 1, 12, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 488 (1615). Chief Justice Thomas Cooley stated, "there
can be no such steady and imperceptible change in their [constitutions'] rules as inheres in the
principles of the common law." THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 88 (7th
ed. 1903).
78. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 35, at 209.
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Marbury v. Madison he held that Congress could not "alter" the Consti-
tution.79 Church's "evolution" is simply bootstrap lifting, by which the
Court conferred upon itself power that had been withheld. No passage of
time can legitimate the arrogation;80 nor does repetition legitimate usur-
pation. Squatter sovereignty does not run against the sovereign people.81
Since both the legislative and executive branches "have enlarged
their capacity to exercise power far beyond what the founders contem-
plated," Church urges, "an alert, expansive judicial authority may be re-
quired to maintain an effective check on their power."82 This is indeed
paradoxical. For he recognizes that the courts "have been a major player
in the drama, contributing to the shift toward central power by sanction-
ing both an enormous expansion of the general authority of the other
branches ... and an extension of federal authority over the states."83
Now to call upon the courts to restore the balance which they were a
leading actor in upsetting, is like asking a looter to guard the store
against break-ins.
JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING
"[C]urrent policy needs," Church remarks, "differ from those of two
centuries ago";"a hence he would encourage the courts to "lay open claim
to policy-making power."'8 5 The courts can only "claim" what they have
been granted. It lies beyond their delegation to "constitutionalize" un-
granted jurisdiction. 6 "Innovative constitutional interpretation"8 7 is
merely a euphemism for judicial revision of the Constitution. Church
candidly notes that judicial review was meant "only to police constitu-
tional boundaries; the courts were not expected to substitute their views
of substantive policy for those of elected representatives or agency offi-
79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
80. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court branded the doctrine of Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), "'an unconstitutional assumption of powers... which no
lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.'" Erie, 304
U.S. at 79 (opinion by Brandeis, J.) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,'J., dissenting)).
81. "[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long
use." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970). "Acquiescence for no length of time
can legalize a clear usurpation of power." COOLEY, supra note 77, at 106.
82. Church, supra note 2, at 1091.
83. Id. at 1082. "The federal courts have expanded federal power over the States... not
just by releasing the other branches from constitutional restraints." Id. at 1083.
84. Id. at 1075.
85. Id. at 1091.
86. Id. at 1104.
87. Id. at 1105.
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cials."88 Striking confirmation is furnished by the legislative history.
When Madison proposed that the Justices should participate with the
President in vetoing legislation, he was rebuffed. Nathaniel Gorham saw
no "advantage of employing the Judges in this way. As Judges they are
not to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy
of public measures." 9 And Elbridge Gerry, a vigorous advocate of judi-
cial review, said, "It was quite foreign from the nature of ye. office to
make them judges of the policy of public measures" and "It was making
Statesmen of the Judges .... It was making the Expositors of the Laws,
the Legislators which ought never to be done."90 Church notices "the
traditional understanding of democratic government that policy should
be made by accountable representatives."'" And he is not entirely happy
with judicial policymaking, as appears from his discussion of Missouri v.
Jenkins,92 where the lower federal courts "intervened to reform the pub-
lic school system in Kansas City," "force[d] very large tax increases,"
"dictated the planning process for expenditure of the proceeds," and in
short "essentially took over the whole public policy process. 93 Jenkins,
88. Id. at 1087. Referring to constitutional limitations on legislative power, Justice James
Iredell declared,
Beyond these limitations ... their acts are void, because they are not warranted by
the authority given. But within them.., the Legislatures only exercise a discretion
expressly confided to them by the constitution .... It is a discretion no more con-
troulable ... by a Court ... than a judicial determination is by them ....
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 266 (1796).
The authority of nine unelected jurists to strike down laws would be unacceptable in
a democratic polity, one that is supposed to be "a government of laws, not of men,"
unless judicial review were believed to be guided by a faithful attempt to interpret the
Constitution, the highest law of the land. Consequently, to support their opinions,
the Justices will ignore or even willfully misrepresent the text and history of the
Constitution, rather than admit they are revising it.
John Burleigh, The Supreme Court vs. the Constitution, Pun. INTEREST, Winter 1978, at 151,
151.
89. 2 THE RECORDS Of THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS].
90. 1 id. at 97-98; 2 id. at 75. For an extended discussion of the exclusion of judges from
policy making, see BERGER, supra note 6, at 300-11. Justice James Iredell stated, "These are
considerations of policy, considerations of extreme magnitude, and certainly incompetent to
the examination and decision of a Court of Justice." Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) at 260. Earlier
Judge Henry had spoken to the same effect in Virginia: "The judiciary, from the nature of the
office... could never be designed to determine upon the equity, necessity, or usefulness of a
law; that would amount to an express interfering with the legislative branch .... [N]ot being
chosen immediately by the people nor being accountable to them... they do not, and ought
not, to represent the people in framing or repealing any law." Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va, (1
Va. Cas.) 20, 47 (1793). Kamper was a landmark judicial review case.
91. Church, supra note 2, at 1096.
92. 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
93. Church, supra note 2, at 1100.
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he said, "does not stand in isolation."94 So much for the "valuable...
practical policy guidance" of the courts.95
Several arguments are advanced by Church in defense of judicial
policymaking. Repeatedly he dwells on the gap left by legislative inac-
tion in the face of serious need for remedial action, on "legislative failure
to address issues of acknowledged importance." 96 His criticisms are well
taken; at times Congressional inaction "can create an institutional crisis
by producing a vacuum at the very center of the nation's policy-making
apparatus." 97 Failure to act, however, does not cause Congress' power to
descend on the shoulders of the judiciary. Congress may not abdicate its
powers;98 still less may the judiciary take them over.99 Justice Story con-
demned "doing for the people, what they have not chosen to do for them-
selves.""bc ° Church observes that "[c]ombining the making and execution
94. Id. at 1101. Church underscores "whether an expenditure of the magnitude ordered
by the lower courts is constitutionally acceptable.... [T]he amount required to be spent grew
to about $400 million for one school district." Id. at 1100 n.97.
Church also notes the protracted litigation in Lelsz v. Kavanagh, where the issue was
whether Texas should be compelled by the federal courts to as much as triple the
amount of state funds spent on behalf of institutionalized mentally retarded persons,
to an apparent amount of about $90,000 per year, per patient. Carried over to the
state's entire institutionalized retarded population, this could theoretically result in
annual expenditures of some three-quarters of a billion dollars.
Id. at 1101 n.101; see 824 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1987). Faced by crippling demands for care for
the homeless, AIDS patients, etc., the allocation of state funds seems to me preeminently one
that the state assemblies should decide. Such local issues were left to the states by the
Founders.
95. Church, supra note 2, at 1089.
96. Id. at 1099.
97. Id. at 1098.
98. In his Notes on The State of Virginia (1787), Jefferson wrote, "Our antient laws ex-
pressly declare, that those who are but delegates themselves shall not delegate to others powers
which require judgment and integrity in their exercise." THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 253
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). Respecting the legislative power, Michael Stone said in the
First Congress, "Do you divest yourself of the power by not exercising it? Certainly not." 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 823 (J. Gales ed., 1834). "The Congress manifestly is not permitted to
abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus
vested." Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
121, 122 (1976).
99. Church's reference to the Court's "willingness in recent years to take on a new, ex-
panded, policy role," Church, supra note 2, at 1098, renders palatable the "willingness" of a
trespasser.
100. 1 STORY, supra note 47, § 426, at 325. Justice Story also stated that if a constitutional
restriction
be mischievous, the power of redressing the evil lies with the people by an exercise of
the power of amendment. If they do not choose to apply the remedy, it may fairly be
presumed, that the mischief is less than what would arise from a further extension of
the power; or that it is the least of two evils.
Id. In this, he was anticipated by Madison: "Had the power of making treaties, for example,
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of the law in a single branch violates the essence of the separation of
powers doctrine."' ' Combining the making and judging of law in the
same body suffers from the same vice, as Massachusetts Chief Justice
Hutchinson pungently stated in 1767: "the Judge should never be the
Legislator: Because, then the Will of the Judge would be the Law: and
this tends to a State of Slavery.""1 2
Church, however, extols "the accumulated wisdom and competence
of the nation's corps of judges" and the advantages of judicial training,
procedure and problem solving. 103 "Competence" does not confer
power. Justice Jackson declared, "[n]or does our duty to apply the Bill
of Rights to assertions-of official authority depend upon our possession of
marked competence in the field where the invasion of rights occurs ....
But we act in those matters not by authority of our competence but by
force of our commissions."'" As to the advantages of judicial proce-
dure, Church notes that judges "have very limited resources, with little
staff support... judges must do most of their own work."'' 0 This is no
longer quite true; each Justice now has the assistance of four law clerks,
so that, because of the deluge of cases, as Judge Richard Posner pointed
out, a Justice is reduced to directing traffic to the particular clerks. Even
if the clerk's draft of an opinion is only preliminary, editing, as Posner
observes, is not equivalent to original study and drafting. Something is
lost in the process.' 06 Moreover, the Justices are cloistered in an ivory
been omitted, however necessary it might have been, the defect could only have been lamented,
or supplied by an amendment of the Constitution." 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1900-01 (1791).
101. Church, supra note 2, at 1095.
102. MORTON H. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
5 (1977).
103. Church, supra note 2, at 1088.
104. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943). Woodrow
Wilson, who had some experience in government, said, "'What I fear ... is a government of
experts. God forbid that in a democratic country we should resign the task and give the gov-
ernment over to experts.'" RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN
LIFE 209-10 (1963). An activist judge, J. Skelly Wright, stated, "Any argument for letting the
experts decide ... is an argument for paternalism and against democracy." J. Skelly Wright,
Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 585 (1972), quoted in JOHN H. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 134 (1980)).
105. Church, supra note 2, at 1089.
106. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 102-11 (1985).
Mark Tushnet referred to
the increasing heavy reliance of the Justices on law clerks for the drafting of substan-
tial portions of their opinions .... I would be extremely surprised to discover that
Chief Justice Rehnquist did much more than supervise-'edit' is the polite term-the
work of his law clerks .... Justices of the Supreme Court should now be viewed as
senior partners in little law firms, and it is the rare senior partner who puts pen to
paper.
Mark Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1327 (1990).
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tower, insulated from the affairs of men. In sharp contrast, Congress
employs extensive staffs, sets up Committees with their own staffs, and
has vastly superior facilities for investigation. "[B]ound by the restrictive
formalities of litigation," Church remarks, "courts are effectively pre-
cluded from approaching the capacity of elected representatives to make
policy by enacting legislation." "These limitations," he recognizes, "are
severe."10 7 Unlike the Justices, members of Congress periodically return
to their constituencies to ascertain how the winds of change are blowing.
It is they who are in tune with the times.
Then, too, one may be skeptical about the Court's ultimate wisdom
in policy matters. Over the years the Court has made some egregious
blunders, e.g., the disastrous Dred Scott decision 0 8 which paved the way
to the Civil War. It invalidated a federal income tax,10 9 only to be over-
ruled by the Sixteenth Amendment. In our own time a backlash con-
strained it to retreat from its invalidation of death penalties.110 The
record before 1937, wrote Henry Steele Commager, "reveals. . . that the
Court has effectively intervened, again and again, to defeat Congressional
attempts.., to protect workingmen, to outlaw child labor, to assist hard-
pressed farmers, and to democratize the tax system."'' Shortly before
he ascended to the Supreme Court, Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson
wrote, "[T]ime has proved that [the Court's] judgment was wrong on the
most outstanding issues upon which it has chosen to challenge the popu-
lar branches,"' 12 a stricture confirmed by respected scholars."'
Church argues, however, that courts "have at most only a modest
influence," that "the danger of aggrandizement by the courts is mini-
mal," and that "rumors of incipient judicial hegemony are greatly exag-
gerated.""' 4 The one man-one vote and desegregation cases scarcely
represent a "modest influence.""' 5  Church himself notes that the
Supreme Court "has considerably expanded its reach to include review of
107. Church, supra note 2, at 1090.
108. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426-27, 452 (1857).
109. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895).
110. RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE
125-26 (1982).
111. Henry S. Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy, 19 VA. Q. 417, 428 (1943).
112. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY x (1941) (preface).
113. James M. Bums, Dictatorship--Could It Happen Here? in HAS THE COURT Too
MUCH POWER?, 234, 236 (Charles Roberts ed., 1974); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a
Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAW 279, 292-93
(1957).
114. Church, supra note 2, at 1089, 1090.
115. Edmund Cahn stated that "as a practical matter it would have been impossible to
secure adoption of a constitutional amendment to abolish 'separate but equal.'" Edmund
Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 156 (1955). See supra note 90.
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state and local policies over a broad range of subjects, including criminal
procedure, abortion, termination of life, religious displays, school prayer,
health care, land use and education." This expansion, to Which may be
added supervision of prisons, care for retarded children and the like, he
observes, "would almost certainly have astounded the founders."'
116
"[C]entralization of power," he notes, can lead to "political tyranny." 117
And he concludes that "cause for alarm over the rise of judicial power
may well be justified."' 18
FEDERALISM
By "federalism," Church comments, the Founders meant that "pol-
icy-making power should be decentralized by dividing it geographically
among federal, state and local governments." He observes that "the
founders were deeply committed to the principle that power should be
shared with the states rather than monopolized at the federal level."' 19
"Shared" does small justice to the actualities. The states preceded the
nation, 120 and they surrendered to the newly fashioned central govern-
ment certain described powers while retaining the rest.1 21 In The Feder-
alist No. 39 Madison stated that the jurisdiction of the proposed
government "extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to
the several states a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other
objects." 12 2 Federal jurisdiction, he explained in No. 45,
will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negotiation, and foreign commerce .... The powers reserved to
the several states will extend to all the objects, which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement
and prosperity of the state.1
23
116. Church, supra note 2, at 1084.
117. Id. at 1084-85.
118. Id. at 1102.
119. Id. at 1082.
120. RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 21-47 (1987).
121. Hamilton said of the Constitution, "Here.. the people surrender nothing; and as
they retain everything, they have no need of particular reservations." THE FEDERALIST, supra
note 73, No. 84, at 558 (Alexander Hamilton); see BERGER, supra note 120, at 53-54, 155.
122. Id., No. 39, at 249, (James Madison).
123. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 73, No. 45, at 303 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
In the Convention James Wilson stated that "the powers of peace, war, treaties, coinage and
regulating of commerce ought to reside" in the general government. And he repeated that
"War, commerce and Revenue were the great objects of the Genl. Government." 1 RECORDS,
supra note 89, at 413; 2 id. at 275.
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In this he echoed Roger Sherman's remark in the Constitutional Conven-
tion.124 Each regime, Hamilton explained, would be supreme and have
exclusive jurisdiction in its own sphere. 2 ' Church recognizes that the
"federal courts have expanded federal power over the states."'
26
The extent of these incursions is illuminated by Garcia v. San
124. Sherman stated:
The objects of the Union ... were few. 1. defence agst. foreign danger. 2. agst.
internal disputes & a resort to force. 3. Treaties with foreign nations 4 regulating
foreign commerce, & drawing revenue from it. These & perhaps a few lesser objects
alone rendered a Confederation of the States necessary. All other matters civil &
criminal would be much better in the hands of the States.
I RECORDS, supra note 89, at 133.
125. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 73, No. 32, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton). "The laws of
the United States are supreme, as to all their proper, constitutional objects: the laws of the
states are supreme in the same way." 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 336 (Washington
1836); see also id. at 362 ("The truth is, the states, and the United States, have distinct objects.
They are both supreme. As to national objects, the latter is supreme; as to internal and domes-
tic objects, the former."). Chief Justice Marshall stated, "In America, the powers of sover-
eignty are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the States. They are
each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect
to the objects committed to the other." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410
(1819).
Chancellor Kent wrote, "[T]he principal rights and duties which flow from our civil and
domestic relations, fall within the control, and we might almost say the exclusive cognizance,
of the state governments." 1 KENT, supra note 42, at 445, quoted in MARK HOWE, JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 1870-1882, at 30 (1963). Henry Adams
considered that "[t]he doctrine of states' rights was in itself a sound and true doctrine; as a
starting point of American history and constitutional law there is no other which will bear a
moment's examination." HENRY ADAMS, JOHN RANDOLPH 273 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin
& Co. 1883).
126. Church, supra note 2, at 1083. Among the "benefits" of this "expansion" Church lists
are "the absence of state and local barriers to trade and travel, a single currency ... national
constraints on state and location taxation of interstate commerce." Id. at 1085. These, how-
ever, were part of the original scheme. Article IV gave members of one state the right to travel
to another state and do business there. U.S. CONST. art. IV. The power "to coin Money" and
to punish counterfeiters provided for a single national currency. Id. art: I, § 8, cls. 5, 6. And
the power to regulate interstate commerce derived from the need to halt exactions by one state
from another. BERGER, supra note 120, at 125. Similarly, the need for "strong international
trading" and "military presence," Church, supra note 2, at 1086, were provided for by the
power to regulate foreign commerce and provide for an army and navy. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cls. 3, 12, 13. They were not a judicial construct.
Church considers that the areas of "health, science and education" pose "national
problems." Church, supra note 2, at 1086. They were not so regarded by the Founders.
Madison's proposal to establish a national university was rejected. 2 RECORDS, supra note 89,
at 616. In the Virginia Ratification Convention, Judge Edmund Pendelton assured the Ra-
tifiers that "'Our dearest rights... are still in the hands of our state legislature.'" BERGER,
supra note 120, at 56. In 1885, the Court declared that no Amendment "was designed to
interfere with the power of the State ... to prescribe regulations to promote the health...
education ... and good order of the people." Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
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Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,127 which decided by a five to
four vote that municipal mass transit is governed by federal minimum
wages and hours standards. Under Garcia one who rides by subway in
New York City from 42d Street to 72d Street is engaged in interstate
commerce! Even worse, the Court abdicated its function as arbiter of
opposing federal and state claims and left differences over the reach of
interstate commerce to Congress, making it the judge of its own powers,
the very department against which the states relied on the Court for pro-
tection. 121 Challenges to that course are not "scholastic arguments over
the niceties of history," '29 or "pedantic arguments over historical nu-
ances." 130 They go to the very heart of our constitutional system. With-
out clear-cut assurances that the states' unsurrendered "residuary" rights
would be "inviolable," the Constitution would have failed of adoption. 
131
Those who are result-oriented rejoice in the Court's midwifery to
the corporate expansion of industry, railroads, and communications
which all but erased state lines. Today, when Justice Brennan is being
deified for his leadership in promoting a social revolution, it is not easy to
prefer the integrity of the Constitution. But as Washington said in his
Farewell Address,
If in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification
of the Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it
be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitu-
tion designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for
though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it
is the customary weapon by which free governments are
destroyed. 
32
Church urges, however, that the amendment process "is too cumbersome
and erratic to serve as the sole vehicle for constitutional develop-
ment."' 13 3 But it is made the "sole vehicle" by Article V. 134 Since when
is compliance with law excused because it is too onerous? "Cumber-
someness" affords no dispensation to the judiciary to ignore the Article V
127. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
128. For a detailed discussion, see BERGER, supra note 120, at 164-77.
129. Church, supra note 2, at 1086.
130. Id. at 1105.
131. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 73, No. 39, at 249 (James Madison). Herbert Wechsler
wrote, "Federalism was the means and price of formation of the Union." The Founders "pre-
served the states as separate sources of authority and organs of administration-a point on
which they hardly had a choice." Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954).
132. 35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 229 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
133. Church, supra note 2, at 1078.
134. U.S. CONST. art. V; see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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reservation of amendment to the people. 135 "An agent," said Hamilton,
"cannot new-model his own commission." '136 The most benign purpose
does not empower the Court to expand its delegated powers.
CONCLUSION
Church sees the question as "whether an expansion of judicial
power will accomplish useful ends in the long run."'137 Assume that such
expansion is desirable, that does not authorize the Court to enlarge its
jurisdiction. 138 What expanded judicial power can mean is illustrated by
Church's remark that the "tenth amendment may have little more than
rhetorical value."' 39 Thus the Court has reduced to a cipher the crown-
ing Amendment of the Bill of Rights, which expressed the central con-
cern of the states-a guarantee that the federal newcomer would not
invade their sovereignty."4 That judicial deletion of so prized an
135. Hamilton stated:
Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the
established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually;
and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their repre-
sentatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 73, No. 78, at 509 (Alexander Hamilton). In the First Congress,
Elbridge Gerry, a Framer, stated, "The people have [directed a] particular mode of making
amendments, which we are not at liberty to depart from." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 503 (Gales &
Seaton eds., 1836) (Print bearing running title "History of Congress"); see supra note 64.
Writing of the one person-one vote decision, Vannevar Bush, a noted scientist and engi-
neer, stated that supporting that decision
on the basis of necessity, since the regular legislative process would not correct an
obviously unfair situation ... is saying in effect that the democratic system will not
work, and that it must be supplemented by absolute power in the hands of a group of
men independent of the public will. This is a hazardous concept....
VANNEVAR BUSH, PIECES OF THE ACTION 17-18 (1970).
136. 6 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 61, at 166.
137. Church, supra note 2, at 1105.
138. Chief Justice Marshall declared, "The peculiar circumstances of the moment may
render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or less constitutional." JOHN
MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 35, at 190-91. "The criterion of
constitutionality," said Justice Holmes, "is not whether we believe the law to be for the public
good." Adkins v. Childrens' Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 570 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting), over-
ruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
139. Church, supra note 2, at 1083. Justice Story observed that the Tenth Amendment
"was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies, which had been excited." 1
STORY, supra note 47, § 433, at 331-32. David Currie decried "the dangerous principle that
constitutional provisions that did not suit contemporary needs need not be respected." David
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
504, 553 (1987).
140. Justice Story said of the Tenth Amendment, "Its sole design is to exclude any inter-
pretation, by which other powers should be assumed beyond those, which are granted." 1
STORY, supra note 47, § 1908, at 653. As late as 1975, the Court affirmed that "[t]he Amend-
ment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Amendment should not so much as elicit an expression of shock testifies
to the depth of the activist commitment to judicial revision of the
Constitution.
It will be recalled that Philip Kurland explained that the very nature
of a written constitution required that it be fixed and unalterable except
as it provided. Early on this was the view of Justice Story: "[T]he policy
of one age may ill suit the wishes, or the policy of another. The constitu-
tion is not to be subject to such fluctuations. It is to have a fixed, uni-
form, permanent construction." '4 1 It is because activists cannot find
footing in the Constitution for effectuation of their desires that they laud
judicial "adaptation" of the Constitution to changing times. 142 These are
not "pedantic arguments over historical nuances." '143 Said Justice
Harlan: "When the Court disregards the express intent and understand-
ing of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political processes to
which the amending procedure was committed, and it has violated the
constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect." 144 The
departures of Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall portend
a new day; 45 and I anticipate that as the New Court proves less complai-
sant to activist demands, we shall hear squeals of anguish.146 For them
the Court will cease to be a Daniel-Come-to-Judgment. They will learn
that the name of the game is "Two Can Play."
fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
141. STORY, supra note 47, § 426, at 326.
142." Justice Black dismissed "rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court to keep the
Constitution in tune with the times .... The Constitution makers knew the need for change
and provided for it" by the amendment process. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
143. Church, supra note 2, at 1105.
144. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); see Guido Calabresi, What Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
1991, § 4, at 15.
145. Church considers that with Brennan's "replacement by Justice David Souter, there is
a strong possibility that the Court will shift toward a relatively 'stricter,' more 'historical'
interpretation of the United States Constitution and away from 'judicial legislation.'"
Church, supra note 2, at 1071. That possibility has been enhanced by the resignation of Justice
Thurgood Marshall.
146. Already Dean Guido Calabresi of the Yale Law School stated "I despise the current
Supreme Court and find its... behavior disgusting." Calabresi, supra note 144, at 15. Earlier,
for example, the "fresh raw wound" caused by the Court's retreat from its invalidation of
death penalties set Charles Black to "'wondering whether we liberals... may not be in part to
blame for a ... quite evident trend toward the point of view that reason doesn't matter much,
and can be brushed aside, if only the result is thought desirable."' BERGER, supra note 6, at
346. For a detailed discussion of this Address, see id. at 346-50; see also Charles Krautham-
mer, Look Who's Discovered Judicial Restraint, WAsH. PoST, July 19, 1991, § A, at 21
(Charles Krauthammer's satirical column on Lawrence Tribe's change of heart in opposing the
nomination to the Supreme Court of Judge Clarence Thomas).
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Just now activism is in the ascendant; opponents are branded as
deviants from the "mainstream," a mainstream that is only about 45
years old, and that swept away 150 years of judicial landmarks while
flouting the will of the Founders.147 When it dawns on the people that
judicial activism deprives them of self-government and vests it in an
unelected, unaccountable, and virtually irremovable judiciary, the deci-
sions of which profoundly affect their destiny, activism will atrophy.
147. "The list of opinions destroyed by the Warren Court," Philip Kurland observed,
"reads like a table of contents from an old constitutional law casebook." PHILIP KURLAND,
POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 90-91 (1970).
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